A cow raised for her milk is forcefully impregnated yearly, and her babies are taken away within a few days. She is either pregnant or lactating 9 or 10 months out of a year only to have the cycle repeat once she gives birth.

All calves are taken from their mothers within a few days. Some female calves become dairy cows and the rest, along with male calves, are sold for veal.

Many organic or local dairies advertise with pictures of happy cows. In reality, “organic” only means that the cows are fed organic food and are not given antibiotics and growth hormones but they are still, under the very best of circumstances, tortured. And all of those mothers–whether on a conventional or “organic” farm–end up in the same hideous slaughterhouse.

There is no such thing as “happy” milk or “happy” animal products of any type.

Today, think about the suffering and death you support just because you like the taste of dairy, cheese, butter, yogurt, ice cream, etc. Think of what that means for cows, the gentle mothers whom we exploit. Ask yourself if it’s worth it. If your heart says “no,” go vegan.

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Being vegan is a matter of nonviolence. Being vegan is your statement that you reject violence to other sentient beings, to yourself, and to the environment, on which all sentient beings depend.

The World is Vegan! If you want it.

Gary L. Francione
Professor, Rutgers University

©2012 Gary L. Francione

No related posts.

The World is Vegan! If you want it.

Gary L. Francione
Professor, Rutgers University

©2012 Gary L. Francione

Related posts:

1. Commentary #3: On Michael Vick
2. Some Further Thoughts on Michael Vick
3. What Michael Vick Taught Us
4. The Santería Case: Michael Vick, Part 2
5. “Happy Meat:” Making Humans Feel Better About Eating Animals

I want to examine some aspects of this position as a general matter which, in many ways, is really not new with the New Atheists. I want also to discuss how this position affects our thinking about animal ethics given that, for the past several years, I have noted an increase in animal advocates who believe that animal rights are able to be grounded securely on rationality and science alone and who reject the notion that there can be independent moral truths or that actions can be intrinsically wrong.

Let me make two points at the outset: First, this is an involved issue that requires more than a single blog post. I am offering my preliminary thoughts here and will have much more to say at a later time in work that I am doing on moral realism and animal rights.

Second, I want to stress that if we reject scientific rationality as providing what we need to know about morality, we are not relegated to embracing “supernatural” beliefs or retreating to some sort of moral relativism or subjectivism. One may subscribe to views about moral realism or may accept the principle of nonviolence as a moral truth, for example, without subscribing to views about a creator deity or the survival of personality past death. Indeed, part of the problem is that this debate is often characterized as one requiring that, if we reject relativism, subjectivism, or some similar view, we must choose between the supernatural or scientific rationality. That is a false choice.

Please Choose One: Utilitarians or Jihadists:

Literary theorist Terry Eagleton notes in his review of Dawkins’ The God Delusion: “Apart from the occasional perfunctory gesture to ‘sophisticated’ religious believers, Dawkins tends to see religion and fundamentalist religion as one and the same.”

Moreover, Dawkins also tends to see the notion of rule-based morality as related to religion, and, given that Dawkins tends to equate religion and fundamentalist religion, he draws comparisons between rule-based morality and religious fundamentalism.

For example, in The God Delusion, Dawkins, after paying some lip service to Kant, and noting that although “[d]eontology is not quite the same thing as moral absolutism,” says that “for most purposes in a book about religion there is no need to dwell on the distinction.” He says that although “[n]ot all absolutism is derived from religion. Nevertheless, it is pretty hard to defend absolutist morals on grounds other than religious ones.”

I certainly would agree that we need some form of moral realism to provide a secure foundation for the absolute moral standards that I regard as true: that is absolutely wrong to engage in, for example, the exploitation of the vulnerable; it is absolutely wrong to engage in rape or child molestation or animal exploitation. But it is not necessary to derive the foundation for those standards from religion.

Dawkins notes that, in contrast to deontologists, “[c]onsequentialists more pragmatically hold that the morality of an action should be judged by its consequences,” and he contrasts the “absolutist” with the “consequentialist or utilitarian” who has greater flexibility to consider moral issues. So it appears as though Dawkins is trying to characterize consequential theories, such as utilitarianism, as less likely to be related to the absolutism of fundamentalist religion than rights theories. Sound familiar? Have you ever heard animal welfare supporters, who are always consequentialists of one sort or another, characterize those who support animal rights as “fundamentalists”?

In any event, to the extent that this debate is seen to be a contest between New Atheists or religious fundamentalists who advocate killing abortion doctors, engage in suicide bombing, pray for the apocalypse, fly planes into buildings, promote all sorts of discrimination and hatred, and generally support every conceivable sort of violence in the name of their gods, the New Atheists win easily without the sort of scrutiny and discussion that this matter requires.

But the debate between the New Atheists and others requires more than choosing whether we like utilitarians more than jihadists. The more interesting aspect of the debate focuses on the position that any talk of objective moral truth or absolute moral standards divorced from scientific rationality is problematic and must be rejected if one does not want to be an “enemy of reason.” In this sense, the debate is seen as one between the New Atheists and anyone who maintains that we need some objective, stance-independent moral truth, some absolute moral standards that go beyond what science is able to tell us. Although religious extremists certainly fall into this second group, even if they were not anywhere on the scene, the more general controversy would still exist.

I want to focus on those members of the second group who embrace some version of moral realism, or the notion that moral statements report claims that purport to be true or false and that at least some of these claims are true. For example, a moral realist regards the statement, “slavery is wrong” to be similar to the statement, “the chair is brown.” The first statement, like the second, purports to report a fact, albeit a moral one, and both are true if things are as is claimed (slavery is wrong; the chair is brown). Moral realism is not the view that moral truths are constructed, or made true, as a result of what people value morally; rather, moral truths exist independently of any perspective, including ideal perspectives. I also want to include in this second group, in addition to moral realists, those who have views connected with non-Western (and often non-theistic) spiritual traditions that promote nonviolence, or who subscribe to traditional theistic religions but who reject the interpretations of those traditions that support violence and hatred and, instead, embrace interpretations that support universal love and nonviolence.

An example of the sort of debate I have in mind (but will not discuss in any detail here) is the one between Christopher Hitchens and Chris Hedges, or between Sam Harris and Hedges. Hedges rejects the sort of religious fundamentalism that serves as the primary target of the New Atheists. But he argues that scientific rationality is not the answer in that both groups are equally intolerant: “Those who do not see as they see, speak as they speak and act as they act are worthy only of conversion or eradication.”

The debate between Hedges and the New Atheists is informed to some degree by the fact that Hedges, a former foreign correspondent and Pulitzer-Prize winning journalist, reported on conflicts in the Middle East, Balkans, Africa, and Central America, and has spent a great deal of time witnessing all sorts of atrocities. He understandably tends to focus the debate on how the New Atheists seem to support things like the Iraq war, as did Hitchens, or the claim by Harris that we are “at war with Islam.”

Although I agree generally with Hedges’ take on the New Atheists, I want to explore the issue from a more general perspective. I argue in the next section that the notion that we ought to act rationally at all is a normative notion that, like the axioms of mathematics, cannot be “proved” and must be accepted as true.

But even if rationality is itself accepted as normatively desirable or even as some sort of formal requirement, we cannot provide answers to moral issues without appealing to moral beliefs that cannot be “proved” within the framework of science and rationality and depend for their truth–if they are true–on something that is independent of contingent desires, standpoints, perspectives, or passions. I then consider a related issue: that science is a social activity that cannot be divorced from political and moral considerations.

Rationality and Moral Truth

Rationality is about the suitability of means to ends. When we say that a person is irrational, we generally mean s/he is choosing means that are inappropriate for a particular end.

Rationality is also about the coherence of beliefs. If I believe “if X then Y” and I also believe “X,” then I ought also to believe “Y.”

But there are two senses in which the claim “we ought to be rational” requires normative notions and the very same unprovable beliefs some pejoratively dismiss.

First, let’s start with the claim “we ought to be rational” without regard for what rationality requires us to do or to believe.

Why? Why “ought” we to be rational at all? Why “ought” we to believe “Y” if we believe “If X then Y” and “X.”

How can we “prove” these “ought” statements?

The short answer is that we can’t prove them. They, like the axioms of mathematics, cannot be proved and have to be accepted as true. That is, the claim “we ought to be rational” is a normative position no more secured than the claim “we ought to be kind to and love each other.”

Now, a comeback might be that, although we cannot prove the truth of the claim “we ought to be rational,” this claim must be true because without it, we could not make claims or have arguments in the first place. But that is simply not the case. Even if we did not recognize the objective truth of rationality, we could still make claims and have arguments that would be valid or invalid. We could just not maintain that someone who did not accept the conclusion of sound argument was being irrational. So this reply still leaves an “ought” to explain at the most basic level.

Second, even if we ignore the foregoing concerns and we accept that we ought to choose the means most conducive to our ends, or that we ought to hold beliefs that are consistent with our other beliefs, what does rationality have to say about what ends we choose and what beliefs we have?

The answer: nothing. Nothing at all.

Rationality is a formal requirement at best and cannot serve to identify what ends we ought to choose or what beliefs we ought to have. For example, engaging in conduct that will bring about the end of the world is irrational if you do not see the extinction of life as a desirable end. But for those who think extinction is valuable because they regard humans as a blight on the earth, or who do not care about future generations, or who value things that cause damage to the planet, environmentally destructive behavior may be perfectly rational. Rationality cannot decide the issue of whether humankind is a blight upon the earth and should be extinguished or whether we have an obligation to ensure that the planet is healthy for future generations because humans have moral value.

Similarly, if I believe “all humans have equal inherent value” and I accept that the members of group X are, in fact, human, then rationality of belief requires that I conclude that members of group X have inherent value equal to other humans.

But, despite philosopher Immanuel Kant’s view that reason requires the recognition of equal inherent value for humans, I may reject egalitarianism because I believe that those humans who excel at art or music have greater inherent value than the rest of us because they enrich our lives in a way that others do not. I may take the position that these “special” humans do not act wrongly if they treat others in a wholly instrumental way. Although Kant makes compelling arguments about equality that I argue in my own work should be extended to nonhumans, there is simply no way that we can, using rationality alone, “prove” that Kant is right. Kant’s theory (with or without my modifications) requires that we hold certain moral beliefs about membership in the moral community and no “objective” rationality can compel us to hold those views.

The choice of ends to value, or of moral beliefs to hold, involves something beyond rationality. And there is no way that anyone can avoid that. New Atheists Hitchens and Harris, and Chris Hedges, are all rational people in that they accept that their beliefs ought to be consistent with each other. But they have very different moral beliefs.

It is interesting to note that some of the most prominent New Atheists believe, as did Ayn Rand, that rational, atheistic thought leads us in a direction that just happens to fit with a right-wing world view. As mentioned previously, Hitchens was a strong defender of the Iraq war and held a number of right-wing views and Sam Harris tells us that we are “at war with Islam” and states: “The link between belief and behavior raises the stakes considerably. Some propositions are so dangerous that it may even be ethical to kill people for believing them.” Indeed, Harris purports to demonstrate that we can “scientifically” prove that Islam is a morally bad religion.

Whether or not one agrees with these views (I certainly do not), it is rather silly to deny that they reflect belief in certain moral notions that cannot be proved true in some “objective” or non-controversial way. Chris Hedges disagrees with these views and it is not because he is irrational. He simply accepts a different set of moral principles. The debate between the New Atheists, who have all sorts of belief in a variety of normative notions, and people like Hedges, cannot be resolved by any appeal to rationality; it can only be resolved by deciding whose vision of morality you share.

Noam Chomsky describes Harris and Hitchens as “religious fanatics” who believe in the “religion of the state” in that they argue we have to defend the violence and atrocities of the state because it’s being done to ensure human progress and to achieve other wonderful consequences.

This notion that the world is moving in a positive direction also finds expression in Dawkins, who defends some complete gibberish called the “moral Zeitgeist” that he describes as a “broad liberal consensus of ethical principles” that we are moving toward and that is not driven by religion and that develops despite religion. Putting aside that some of the values he describes positively have been driven primarily by nonviolent interpretations of religious and spiritual traditions, some of the arguments he makes to show that things are getting better are quite remarkable. For example, he tells us that Hitler “would not have stood out in the time of Caligula or Ghengis Khan.” He acknowledges that there have been civilian casualties in Iraq, but they are “orders of magnitude lower than comparable numbers for the Second World War.” Putting aside that Dawkins judges wars morally by the number of casualties (should we just, say, invade countries that have no armies?; that would certainly reduce casualties), the “moral Zeitgeist” is on the move because fewer people died in a fabricated “preventative” war against a nonthreatening adversary (Saddam Hussein) than died in a war against Hitler, who was himself a big step forward from Caligula.

Frankly, I find Dawkins’ views here to be reactionary in a breathtaking way.

Interestingly, Sam Harris claims to be a moral realist. But just as my claiming to President of the United States does not make me President, Harris’ claiming to be a moral realist does not make it so. Moral realism is, in the words of Russ Schafer-Landau, in his book Moral Realism: A Defence (Oxford 2003), the belief that “there are moral truths that obtain independently of any preferred perspective, in the sense that the moral standards that fix the moral facts are not made true by virtue of their ratification within any given actual or hypothetical perspective.” It does not appear to me that Harris is a realist in this sense.

Although Harris is not clear, he appears to be arguing that, because of the sorts of beings we are, we cannot help but value well-being, which we treat as objectively valuable, and regard ourselves as morally obligated to generate as much well-being as possible. That would make Harris a constructivist in that what he is saying on this interpretation is that well-being is made to be a “true” moral value as a result of our perspective.

Alternatively, Harris may be claiming that, as a matter of the meaning of language, claims about morality are really descriptive claims about well-being and science can tell us whether those claims are true or false. That is, just as we say that we cannot engage in science without valuing a certain sort of evidence, coherence, etc., because that is just what is, by definition, to do science, we cannot engage in moral activity without valuing well-being because that is, by definition, what it is to engage in moral activity. Therefore, when we say, “John ought to do action A” what we mean is that “If John does A, well-being will likely happen.” Science can tell us whether and to what extent A will produce well-being. But that involves a simple semantic deflation (Harris says that moral statements are “identical” to factual statements about well-being) and allows Harris to avoid (in his view) the is/ought problem. There is no appeal to any ultimate normative standard as objectively true. This is not a position of moral realism.

If Harris is read as saying that that well-being is valuable in the sort of stance-independent way that Shafer-Landau contemplates and that we are obligated to maximize it, then he is just another consequentialist thinker and adds nothing new to ethical theory except, perhaps, for introducing the notion that we can “scientifically” prove his ethnocentric and xenophobic pronouncements, such as that Islam is a morally bad religion.

Getting an “Ought” from the “Is” Claims of Science

The New Atheists, or some of them, tell us that notions of objective or stance-independent moral truth, or spiritual or religious beliefs, cannot tell us what “is.” Only science can tell us what the “real” facts are. Science provides objective Truth. Everything else is something less than Truth.

Again, this view ignores that the metatheories that establish what is regarded as “science” are, like the axioms of mathematics or the position that rationality is a formal requirement, things that must be accepted as true and cannot be proved to be true. Although those subscribing to New Atheism might accept this as an abstract proposition, they fail to understand its meaning for their enterprise.

Thomas Kuhn in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, probably the most influential book on the philosophy of science written in the 20th century, popularized the use of “paradigm” to describe the scientific achievements that serve for some period of time to determine what is to be observed, what sorts of questions are to be asked, how any investigations are to be structured, and how results of investigations are to be interpreted. Kuhn argued persuasively that paradigms could not be proved true or false and that it was naive to view science as “Truth.” Different paradigms represent different worldviews; different points of view.

Paul Feyerabend in works such as Against Method pushed this notion even further, arguing against the rationalist idea there are identifiable rules of scientific method that determine what science is “good” science. Feyerabend promoted the notion that science involves more myth than scientists want to acknowledge and that success by scientists has often involved non-scientific elements, including inspiration from mythical or religious sources. Feryerabend made clear that the line with science on one side and religion, myth, magic, and everything else on the other side, is as much of a myth as what scientists claim to reject as myth.

But even if you do not accept what Kuhn, Feyerabend (and many others) have said about the assumptions that science must make and that cannot be proved, or that there is no bright line between science and religion, it cannot be seriously believed that science as practiced is somehow separate from political and social institutions. As Richard Levins and Richard Lewontin pointed out in their groundbreaking book, The Dialectical Biologist, science occurs within a social context and reflects an inherently political perspective.

To understand this point, let us look at an example involving Richard Dawkins’ 1976 book, The Selfish Gene. Is Dawkins making a “scientific” claim about the “facts” of genes, or is he instead focusing on human selfishness and altruism and using these human behaviors to provide a supposedly “scientific” description of the evolutionary process as a general matter, which he then uses to explain human selfishness and altruism? I believe, with philosopher Mary Midgley and others, that the position that Dawkins proposes is a hypothesis that relies more on the reductive individualism of the Enlightenment than it does on Darwin’s views, which, as Midgley argues, involved interaction and cooperation, and that the selfish gene is not some fact of nature. It is fascinating to note that Dawkins’ book became popular precisely at the time that the Reagan/Thatcher notions about the desirability of selfishness, independence, and individualism became popular.

Sam Harris states explicitly as a “fact” that we are “at war with Islam.” Does that “fact” represent an objectively true “is” statement, or does it merely reflect Harris’ adherence to certain political beliefs that determine how he interprets what is happening in the world and the “facts” that he finds? Harris claims that the Taliban morality is bad “from the point of view of science.”

Science tells us that we ought to believe what the evidence appears to show. That is itself a normative claim. But let’s assume that we ought to believe what the evidence shows. What counts as evidence? The answer is that certain evidence, which is consistent with the assumptions of the scientific paradigm, counts, but all other evidence is excluded and ignored. There can be completely different sorts of empiricism (the theory that all knowledge comes from the senses as opposed to being innate). It is incorrect to say that moral realism or all spiritual traditions are unconcerned with evidence or that there is no evidence for them. There is a concern for evidence and there is evidence; it is just not recognized as “scientific” knowledge because science rejects that sort of evidence from the outset. There are many things to measure; science measures only some and even defines how measurement can proceed. Everything else is ignored.

And, as William James maintained, we may be justified in having spiritual or religious beliefs even though we do not have evidence for those beliefs.

The New Atheists offer an incomplete and impoverished choice: a false dichotomy between religious fundamentalism and, what is, in effect, scientism, or “an exaggerated trust in the efficacy of the methods of natural science applied to all areas of investigation (as in philosophy, the social sciences, and the humanities).” But assuming that science can provide us with some uncontroversial “is” statements, we can’t get any “ought” statements from those “is” statements. As Chris Hedges notes: “The belief that rational and quantifiable disciplines such as science can be used to perfect human society is no less absurd than a belief in magic, angels and divine intervention.”

The belief that science provides us with “true” answers to significant moral questions has been shown repeatedly to have the most profoundly disturbing results. Science told us that women would be physically damaged if they had too much education; indeed, science has repeatedly been used to justify discrimination on the basis of sex. Science told us that people of color were physically and cognitively different from white people as a “factual” basis for the justification of human slavery. There are countless examples of how science has been used to justify a great deal of violence and a wide range of discrimination.

A critic may counter that science has been used to support good moral ends as well. For example, scientists eventually abandoned “scientific” claims about the supposed physical inferiority of women. But that’s the point. It’s not science that drives morality; it’s morality (and immorality) that drives the science. To take a (very) loose analogy from quantum theory: our moral consciousness determines the reality we see.

Atheism and Animal Rights

Many animal advocates claim to be atheists. They are in error if they think that there is some notion of “objective” rationality, or some combination of rationality and scientific facts, which, though rejecting moral premises, can secure the moral conclusion that we ought to stop exploiting animals.

The abolitionist philosophy that I have developed certainly relies on rational argument but ultimately rests on a foundation of moral realism. For example, when I state, “it is wrong to inflict suffering on a sentient being without an adequate justification,” I mean that to be a principle that represents a moral fact. From this principle, together with the logical premise that the moral notion is meaningless if an adequate justification can include the pleasure, amusement, or convenience of the person(s) imposing the suffering, I argue rationally to the conclusion that we cannot justify most animal use, however “humane” it might be. (I have other arguments against any animal use that is not ruled out by the “necessity” argument.)

So the theory (or that part of it) rests on logic and rationality, and certain nonmoral facts about animal sentience. But you cannot get to any normative conclusion if you don’t agree with the moral fact that it is wrong to inflict suffering on another sentient being without an adequate justification. If you ask me to “prove” the truth of that moral fact using a framework prescribed by science or in a way that every rational person would be compelled to accept, I can’t. That does not mean that “it is wrong to inflict suffering on animals without an adequate justification” is not a moral fact; it does not mean that no evidence supports it. My views are based on moral intuitions, which involve beliefs that are based in experience, but which cannot be “proved” with the sort of evidence that is used in the prevailing paradigm of science. I would, however, maintain that the truth of the moral intuition, “it is wrong to inflict suffering on animals without an adequate justification,” is self-evident, even though its truth does not rest on observation.

Another argument that I make is that if animals are to have any moral significance at all, we must accord them the right not to be treated as property. I argue further that according them that one right requires the abolition of all institutionalized animal use, however “humane.” As in the case of the previous argument, I am relying on a moral intuition: that animals do count morally even if there are cognitive differences between humans and nonhumans. If you share that intuition–if you accept the moral fact that animals matter morally–then rationality requires that you recognize that animals have a pre-legal, basic right not to be property. But rationality does not require that you recognize that animals are not merely things.

Moreover, Peter Singer and others who advocate a welfarist position recognize that animals have morally significant interests but argue, contrary to my position, that we can, as a moral matter, maintain the institution of animal property because animals are not reflectively self-aware in the way that humans are and do not have an interest in continuing to live. Therefore, we may use and kill animals for human purposes as long as we treat them in a way that accords sufficient moral consideration to the interests that they do have, particularly the interest in not suffering.

Therein lies another important matter that cannot be resolved merely by an appeal to rationality or the facts of science. Singer and I agree that sentience is all that is needed for animals to be morally significant, but we disagree in that Singer does not regard sentience as sufficient to give rise to the interest in continued life that, for Singer, is necessary to have at least prima facie moral protection against being used as a resource. I do regard sentience as sufficient to give rise to an interest in continued existence and I argue that this interest should be protected not only as a prima facie matter, but as a matter of moral right, and that we cannot justify any animal use.

Putting aside that I recognize moral rights and Singer does not (another issue that cannot be resolved by an appeal to scientific rationality), there is a sense in which my disagreement with Singer in this regard looks, at least in part, like a factual matter that can be resolved by some sort of “scientific” discovery about animal self-awareness. That is, he says that most animals do not have an interest in continued existence because they are not self-aware; I deny that. Although there is a factual component to this concerning the nature of animal consciousness, there is, more importantly, a non-factual aspect that science cannot resolve as to what counts as self-awareness for moral purposes. Singer maintains that the self-awareness that matters is reflective self-awareness and that most nonhumans are not self-aware in this way; I accept that most animals are probably not reflectively self-aware but I maintain that this is irrelevant in that the only self-awareness that matters for having an interest in continued existence is that which is incidental to the perceptual awareness that requires nothing more than sentience.

So Singer and I may agree on the facts of animal consciousness but come to different conclusions because of our differences as to what ought to be regarded as the sort of self-awareness that counts for having an interest in continued existence. In any event, rationality and science cannot resolve these sorts of disagreements.

Rationality and a Revolution of the Heart

I often say that ending animal exploitation requires “a revolution of the heart.” What I mean by that is that we must reject all ideologies of domination and power, whether religious or secular, that allow us to transform other sentient beings–human or nonhuman–into the “other,” thereby allowing us to ignore their moral value and to treat them as things. We must embrace nonviolence as a basic normative principle–a principle that we see as reflecting a moral truth–and as the foundational moral principle from which all our moral positions flow. Philosopher Gary Steiner’s notion of kinship links up directly with these ideas.

I believe that many spiritual and religious traditions, properly understood, regard nonviolence as a primary value. I reject any that do not. I do not, however, reject them because they are “irrational”; ideologies of power and domination may be perfectly rational if your moral compass points you to them. I reject ideologies of power and domination, whether religious or secular, because they are, in my view, morally in error.

A revolution of the heart requires that we recreate ourselves consistent with the highest aspirations common to all traditions that recognize the importance of nonviolence, and that we reject any framework that promotes violence, discrimination, prejudice, and hatred.

Part of the attraction of the New Atheists is that everyone, including those who may once have embraced a traditional religion, is sick and tired of the violence–the hatred, prejudice, discrimination, wars, materialism, etc.–that is promoted by some institutionalized religions. Rejecting that hatred and violence is a good thing. Many animal advocates correctly note that traditions such as Christianity, Judaism, and Islam have been interpreted to justify speciesism and animal exploitation. This had led a number of these advocates to declare themselves as hostile to spiritual beliefs or to the notion of objective moral truth. But perhaps we ought to consider that the real culprit here is not spiritual or religious belief per se, but the violence that some of these traditions have been interpreted, rightly or wrongly, to promote.

To the extent that violence of any sort is thought to be approved of by “god” or by religion, getting rid of the god or the religion does not necessarily result in peace, love, and justice. Secular institutions promote violence as well.

New Atheist Christopher Hitchens said, “I am absolutely convinced that the main source of hatred in the world is religion, and organized religion.” I disagree. Hatred is the problem; neither religious nor secular institutions cause hatred. They simply provide a mechanism to express it.

I accept that the concept of a revolution of the heart rests on a moral notion that cannot be proved to be “true” in the way that science characterizes truth and given what science regards as acceptable evidence. It requires belief in the moral truth of nonviolence. And scientific rationality cannot get us to that, or to any, moral truth.

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If you are not vegan, please go vegan. It is easy and better for your health and for the environment (assuming that you value your health and the environment but rationality does not require that you do so). But, most important, it is the morally right thing to do (but that is a moral conclusion that rests on an argument that includes moral premises that cannot be derived from scientific facts or some non-normative notion of rationality).

The World is Vegan! If you want it.

Gary L. Francione
Professor, Rutgers University

©2012 Gary L. Francione

Related posts:

1. Short Videos on Animal Rights, Rights vs. Welfare, Animals as Property
2. Human Rights and Animal Rights: Perfect Together
3. The Abolitionist Approach to Animal Rights in China!
4. Animal Rights, Animal Welfare, and the Slavery Analogy
5. Moral Behavior and Moral Significance

As I noted at the time, Singer’s connecting the European effort with cage-free egg farming was misleading:

[A]lthough the European Union has banned the traditional battery cage as of 2012 . . . . egg producers are free under the European ban to use “enriched cages,” which even conservative animal welfare organizations, such as Compassion in World Farming, maintain “fail to overcome many of the welfare problems inherent in the battery cage system.”

I wrote a subsequent essay on the EU “ban,” and, in 2010, I discussed it in my book, The Animal Rights Debate: Abolition or Regulation?, which I co-authored with Professor Robert Garner. It’s not a “ban” at all.

Well, the supposed “ban” on battery cages supposedly came into force on January 1, 2012.

And Peter Singer is excited about it.

In a CNN article entitled, “Singer: Europe’s ethical eggs,” Singer offers profuse praise:

The start of this year is a moment to celebrate a major advance in animal welfare, and, therefore, for Europe, a step towards becoming a more civilized and humane society – one that shows its concern for all beings capable of suffering. It is also an occasion for celebrating the effectiveness of democracy, and the power of an ethical idea.

Wow. Those Europeans have struck a significant blow for animals and for civilization as a general matter.

Or have they?

Put aside that, despite the supposed “ban,” there are about 84 million hens still in the traditional battery cage, with about 300,000 in Britain. Put aside also that cage-free egg production also involves torture and animal exploitation: cage-free eggs involve cramming thousands of birds into one big cage where they live a miserably hideous life that ends in the same miserably hideous slaughterhouse. The “gold standard” of hen exploitation is the “free-range” system, and that also involves the torture (and, of course, killing) of animals.

But, although Singer refers to the EU measure as a “ban on battery cages,” the EU “ban” does not ban battery cages. Yes, producers can use cage-free or free-range systems (which still involve torture, death, and exploitation), but they are not required to do so. What are they required to do?

Replace one cage with another cage: the “enriched” cage. Battery hens are still battery hens. The cage is larger, with nesting boxes and a scratching post.

According to an article in Ecologist: “Battery egg hens still face hell as ‘enriched’ cages phased in”. And here is a video of “enriched cages” that was provided in the Ecologist article:

(Note: This video is from an organization many of whose other campaigns and positions I disagree with.)

Look at the video. “Europe’s ethical eggs,” eh?

It is interesting to note that, in 2002, Compassion in World Farming issued a report, “LAID BARE…The Case Against Enriched cages in Europe” about how terrible “enriched” cages are and who they fail to address the welfare issues raised by the traditional battery cage. But that was then and now is now and big animal groups like CIWF need to be able to declare a victory even when there isn’t one. And so, CIWF is joining with Singer declaring victory and praising the EU “ban” that is not a ban.

I have in my writing cautioned against the use of the word “ban” to apply to welfare reforms, using as an example that a requirement of a larger cage could be characterized, very wrongly in my view, as a “ban” on the smaller cage. On that interpretation, anything could be construed as a “ban.” The EU “ban” on battery cages is a dramatic example of the problem I identified.

But what is so terribly tragic about all of this is that the so-called “father of the animal rights movement” regards the products of tortured animals to be “ethical eggs.” Even if, like Singer, you think that chickens do not have a morally significant interest in living and that killing them for human purposes is not itself morally wrong (a key point of disagreement between me and Singer), how could you possibly regard the EU “ban” that is not a ban as an indication that Europe has stuck a blow for civilization?

The EU “ban” is not doing anything to make our culture more civilized. It is, however, furthering the very dangerous idea that there are “compassionate” ways to torture and exploit nonhuman animals. The “ban” is furthering the idea that continuing to consume eggs is morally defensible as long as we eat “ethical eggs” that have been laid by hens who are in an “enriched” cage or who are otherwise being tortured.

The egg industry is, I am sure, very grateful to Singer and to all of those welfarists who are cheerleading for the idea that we can be “ethical” while we consume eggs, just as the meat and dairy industries are delighted about the endorsement and active promotion of the “happy” meat and animal products movement. This is an example of what I refer to as the “partnership” that animal advocates have with institutionalized animal exploiters. There need not be an explicit agreement of partnership, although in many cases exploiters and animal advocates conduct joint campaigns; animal advocates give “awards” to institutionalized users, promote “happy” meat/dairy labels, etc. All that is necessary is that animal advocates promote what is ultimately best for industry and what will perpetuate, as a social matter, the consumption and exploitation of nonhuman animals.

If anyone thinks that measures such as the EU “ban,” and the fact that animal advocates are campaigning for and praising such measures, are doing anything but making the public more comfortable about consuming animals and animal products, I disagree. No one can credibly deny that Singer’s comments are not an explicit endorsement for “Europe’s ethical eggs.” No one can deny that such an endorsement will matter to those who care about the issue of animal exploitation and are looking for a way to continue to exploit animals “compassionately.” Singer and other supporters of this “ban” and similar measures have just provided the moral license.

There are no “ethical” eggs (or meat or cheese or dairy or whatever) just as there was no “ethical” slavery and just as there is no “ethical” discrimination of any sort.

The EU “ban” that is not a ban is the result of what welfarists acknowledge as “decades of campaigning”. Think of all the time and labor and money that have gone into this one campaign. Now imagine what would have happened if, during those same decades, animal advocates had been promoting a clear, unequivocal vegan message. Would the world be vegan? No, of course not. But there would be many more vegans and the social discourse on this issue would necessarily have been focused on the use of animals as a cultural practice, rather than on the ways in which we can “compassionately” torture and kill sentient nonhumans.

I leave you with a brief poem written by British satirist Spike Milligan (1918-2002):

Rage in Heaven

If a robin redbreast in a cage
Puts all heaven in a rage
How feels heaven when
Dies the millionth battery hen?

******

If you are not vegan, please consider going vegan. It’s a matter of nonviolence. Being vegan is your statement that you reject violence to other sentient beings, to yourself, and to the environment, on which all sentient beings depend.

The World is Vegan! If you want it.

Gary L. Francione
Professor, Rutgers University

©2012 Gary L. Francione

Related posts:

1. A “Bright Spot”?

We must be clear that veganism is the unequivocal baseline of anything that deserves to be called an “animal rights” movement. If “animal rights” means anything, it means that we cannot morally justify any animal exploitation; we cannot justify treating animals as human resources, however “humane” that treatment may be.

We must stop thinking that people will find veganism “daunting” and that we have to promote something less than veganism. If we explain the moral ideas and the arguments in favor of veganism clearly, people will understand. They may not all go vegan immediately; in fact, most won’t. But we should always be clear about the moral baseline. If someone wants to do less as an incremental matter, let that be her/his decision, and not something that we advise to do. The baseline should always be clear. We should never be promoting “happy” or “humane” exploitation as morally acceptable.

The notion that we should promote “happy” or “humane” exploitation as “baby steps” ignores that welfare reforms do not result in providing significantly greater protection for animal interests; in fact, most of the time, animal welfare reforms do nothing more than make animal exploitation more economically productive by focusing on practices, such as gestation crates, the electrical stunning of chickens, or veal crates, that are economically inefficient in any event. Welfare reforms make animal exploitation more profitable by eliminating practices that are economically vulnerable. For the most part, those changes would happen anyway and in the absence of animal welfare campaigns precisely because they do rectify inefficiencies in the production process. And welfare reforms make the public more comfortable about animal exploitation. The “happy” meat/animal products movement is clear proof of that.

We would never advocate for “humane” or “happy” human slavery, rape, genocide, etc. So, if we believe that animals matter morally and that they have an interest not only in not suffering but in continuing to exist, we should not be putting our time and energy into advocating for “humane” or “happy” animal exploitation.

Welfare reforms and the whole “happy” exploitation movement are not “baby steps.” They are big steps–in a seriously backward direction.

There are some animal advocates who say that to maintain that veganism is the moral baseline is objectionable because it is “judgmental,” or constitutes a judgment that veganism is morally preferable to vegetarianism and a condemnation that vegetarians (or other consumers of animal products) are “bad” people. Yes to the first part; no to the second. There is no coherent distinction between flesh and other animal products. They are all the same and we cannot justify consuming any of them. To say that you do not eat flesh but that you eat dairy or eggs or whatever, or that you don’t wear fur but you wear leather or wool, is like saying that you eat the meat from spotted cows but not from brown cows; it makers no sense whatsoever. The supposed “line” between meat and everything else is just a fantasy–an arbitrary distinction that is made to enable some exploitation to be segmented off and regarded as “better” or as morally acceptable. This is not a condemnation of vegetarians who are not vegans; it is, however, a plea to those people to recognize their actions do not conform with a moral principle that they claim to accept and that all animal products are the result of imposing suffering and death on sentient beings. It is not a matter of judging individuals; it is, however, a matter of judging practices and institutions. And that is a necessary component of ethical living.

If we take the position that an assessment that veganism is morally preferable to vegetarianism is not possible because we are all “on our own journey,” then moral assessment becomes completely impossible or is speciesist. It is impossible because if we are all “on our own journey,” then there is nothing to say to the racist, sexist, anti-semite, homophobe, etc. If we say that those forms of discrimination are morally bad, but, with respect to animals, we are all “on our own journey” and we cannot make moral assessments about, for instance, dairy consumption, then we are simply being speciesist and not applying the same moral analysis to nonhumans that we apply to the human context.

When we discuss veganism with vegetarians or other consumers of animal products, we should never convey the message that we think that they are “bad” people. We should instead focus on how any form of animal exploitation is inconsistent with the moral principle that they themselves claim to hold: namely, that animals are members of the moral community and that the imposition of suffering and death on any member of that community–human or nonhuman–requires a compelling justification. And whatever constitutes a compelling justification, taste preferences, conveneience, fashion sense, etc., do not.

Finally, we should always be clear that animal exploitation is wrong because it involves speciesism. And speciesism is wrong because, like racism, sexism, homophobia, antisemitism, classism, and all other forms of human discrimination, speciesism involves violence inflicted on members of the moral community where that infliction of violence cannot be morally justified. But that means that those of us who oppose speciesism necessarily oppose discrimination against humans. It makes no sense to say that speciesism is wrong because it is like racism (or any other form of discrimination) but that we do not have a position about racism. We do. We should be opposed to it and we should always be clear about that.

Veganism is about nonviolence. It is about not engaging in harm to other sentient beings; to oneself; and to the environment upon which all beings depend for life. In my view, the animal rights movement is, at its core, a movement about ending violence to all sentient beings. It is a movement that seeks fundamental justice for all. It is an emerging peace movement that does not stop at the arbitrary line that separates humans from nonhumans. Changing a hierarchical paradigm of pervasive exploitation that has dominated for millenia requires a great deal of hard work. And that hard work requires clarity.

******

If you are not vegan, please consider going vegan. It’s a matter of nonviolence. Being vegan is your statement that you reject violence to other sentient beings, to yourself, and to the environment, on which all sentient beings depend.

The World is Vegan! If you want it.

Gary L. Francione
Professor, Rutgers University

©2012 Gary L. Francione

Related posts:

1. Resolution #1 for 2010: Promote Veganism as the Moral Baseline
2. Why Veganism Must Be the Baseline
3. Moral Behavior and Moral Significance

Fearnley-Whittingstall says: “To be honest, if you drink milk or eat cheese, it’s crueller not to eat it.”

He is completely correct.

The distinction between meat and other animal products is total nonsense. Vegetarianism is a morally incoherent position. If you regard animals as members of the moral community, you really don’t have a choice but to go vegan.

******

If you are not vegan, please consider going vegan. It’s a matter of nonviolence. Being vegan is your statement that you reject violence to other sentient beings, to yourself, and to the environment, on which all sentient beings depend.

The World is Vegan! If you want it.

Gary L. Francione
Professor, Rutgers University

©2012 Gary L. Francione

No related posts.

Does the analogy work?

Yes and no. The slavery analogy, which I have been using for two decades now, is not particularly compelling if one maintains that nonhumans, unlike human slaves, only have an interest in not suffering and do not have an interest in continued life or in autonomy. And that is a core belief of the welfarist position going back to Bentham—that animals can suffer and have interests in not suffering but are cognitively different from us in that they are not self-aware and do not have an interest in continued existence. To put the matter another way: welfarists maintain that animals do not have an interest in not being slaves per se; they just have an interest in being “happy” slaves. That is the position promoted by Peter Singer, whose neo- or new-welfarist views are derived directly from Bentham. Therefore, it does not matter morally that we use animals but only how we use them. The moral issue is not use but treatment.

Add to this that most welfarists are utilitarians—they maintain that what is right or wrong is determined by what maximizes pleasure or happiness or interest satisfaction for all of those affected—and you end up with the view that as long as an animal does not suffer “too much,” and given that the animal does not have an interest in her life, her having lived a reasonably pleasant life and ended up on human plates is better than her not having lived at all. If we provide a reasonably pleasant life and relatively painless death for animals, we actually confer a benefit on them by bringing them into existence and using them as our resources.

Therefore, it is understandable that, if one is a welfarist, one does not accept the slavery analogy. “Happy” slavery is not only not a problem; it is a good thing. The problem with human slavery is that even “humane” forms of slavery violate fundamental human rights in continued existence, autonomy, etc. But if animals do not have those interests, then “humane” slavery may be just what is needed. And that is precisely the thinking that motivates the “happy” meat/animal products movement and the entire welfarist enterprise of trying to make animal use more “humane,” more “compassionate,” etc.

I have argued that this sort of thinking is problematic in at least two regards:

First, the notion that nonhuman animals do not have an interest in continued existence—that they do not have an interest in their lives—involves relying on a speciesist concept of what sort of self-awareness matters morally. I have argued that every sentient being necessarily has an interest in continued existence—every sentient being values her or his life—and that to say that only those animals (human animals) who have a particular sort of self-awareness have an interest in not being treated as commodities begs the fundamental moral question. Even if, as some maintain, nonhuman animals live in an “eternal present”—and I think that is empirically not the case at the very least for most of the nonhumans we routinely exploit who do have memories of the past and a sense of the future—they have, in each moment, an interest in continuing to exist. To say that this does not count morally is simply speciesist.

Second, even if animals do not have an interest in continuing to live and only have interests in not suffering, the notion that, as a practical matter, we will ever be able to accord those interests the morally required weight is simply fantasy. The notion that we property owners are ever going to accord any sort of significant weight to the interests of property in not suffering is simply unrealistic. Is it possible in theory? Yes. Is it possible as a matter of practicality in the real world. Absolutely not. Welfarists often talk about treating “farmed animals” in the way that we treat dogs and cats whom we love and regard as members of our family. Does anyone really think that is practically possible? The fact that we would not think of eating our dogs and cats is some indication that it is not.

Moreover, a central thesis of my work has been that because animals are chattel property—they are economic commodities—we will generally protect animal interests only when we get an economic benefit from doing so. This means that the standard of animal welfare will always be very low (as it presently and despite all of the “happy” and “compassionate” exploitation nonsense) and welfare reforms will generally increase production efficiency; that is, we will protect animal interests in situations where treatment is economically inefficient and welfare reforms will, for the most part, do little more than correct those inefficiencies. For example, the use of gestation crates for sows is economically inefficient; there are supposedly more “humane” alternatives that actually increase production efficiency. Similarly, “gassing” chickens is more economically efficient than electrical stunning.

So I understand why welfarists have a problem with the slavery analogy. I think that they are wrong in multiple respects but they never really engage the arguments. Instead, they claim that I am “divisive” and “do not care about animals suffering now” because I make these arguments. Some get even more dramatic.

The rights paradigm, which, as I interpret it, morally requires the abolition of animal exploitation and requires veganism as a matter of fundamental justice, is radically different from the welfarist paradigm, which, in theory focuses on reducing suffering, and, in reality, focuses on tidying up animal exploitation at its economically inefficient edges. In science, those who subscribe to one paradigm are often unable to understand and engage those who subscribe to another paradigm precisely because the theoretical language that they use is not compatible.

I think that the situation is similar in the context of the debate between animal rights and animal welfare. And that is why welfarists simply cannot understand or accept the slavery analogy.

******

If you are not vegan, please consider going vegan. It’s a matter of nonviolence. Being vegan is your statement that you reject violence to other sentient beings, to yourself, and to the environment, on which all sentient beings depend.

The World is Vegan! If you want it.

Gary L. Francione
Professor, Rutgers University

©2012 Gary L. Francione

Related posts:

1. Short Videos on Animal Rights, Rights vs. Welfare, Animals as Property
2. Human Rights and Animal Rights: Perfect Together
3. Animals as Property and the Rape Analogy: A Postscript
4. Effective Animal Rights Advocacy—in Three Easy Steps
5. Got Faith (in Animal Welfare)?

We are certainly living in difficult and challenging times. But that does not mean that we cannot make a difference. We can.

Here are three suggestions to help you to celebrate peace this holiday season:

First, don’t consume. Take the money that you plan to spend on acquiring more junk that you don’t need and give that money to someone or to a family who needs help in these very difficult times. Or use that money to provide vegan food or non-wool blankets to those at a local Occupy site.

Second, if you are not vegan, go vegan and stop eating, wearing, or consuming animal products. There is no justification for it. And spend a portion of each day engaged in creative, non-violent vegan education. Educational efforts can take many different forms.

Third, adopt a homeless animal. There are so many who need you. If you do not have the room or resources for a dog or cat, adopt a hamster, rabbit, or fish. There is a nonhuman refugee out there who will fit with your life. And if you adopt one (or more), you will not only save the life of another, but you will enrich your own life immeasurably.

Gary L. Francione
Professor, Rutgers University

©2011 Gary L. Francione

Related posts:

1. Commentary #22: The Peace Advocacy Network and the Vegan Pledge Campaign

Machan is a prominent opponent of animal rights.

The debate will take place at Rutgers University School of Law in Newark, New Jersey.

I hope to be able to post a video of the debate here.

************

If you are not vegan, please consider going vegan. It’s easy to go vegan; it’s better for your health and for the planet; and, most important, it’s the morally right thing to do.

The World is Vegan! If you want it.

Gary L. Francione
Professor, Rutgers University

©2011 Gary L. Francione

Related posts:

1. Commentary #21: “The Animal Rights Debate,” the Abolitionist Approach Discussion Forum, and a Response to Nicolette Hahn Niman
2. Debate: The Use of Nonhuman Animals in Biomedical Research: A Moral Justification?
3. Short Videos on Animal Rights, Rights vs. Welfare, Animals as Property
4. Human Rights and Animal Rights: Perfect Together
5. More on Violence and Animal Rights

While self-awareness, the capacity to think ahead and have hopes and aspirations for the future, the capacity for meaningful relations with others and so on are not relevant to the question of inflicting pain . . . these capacities are relevant to the question of taking life. It is not arbitrary to hold that the life of a self-aware being, capable of abstract thought, of planning for the future, of complex acts of communication, and so on, is more valuable than the life of a being without these capacities.

Welfarists distinguish between killing, which is itself not morally objectionable, and the imposition of “unnecessary” suffering, which is morally objectionable. If we give animals a reasonably pleasant life and a relatively painless death, then our exploitation of animals may be morally acceptable. Again, according to Singer:

If it is the infliction of suffering that we are concerned about, rather than killing, then I can also imagine a world in which people mostly eat plant foods, but occasionally treat themselves to the luxury of free range eggs, or possibly even meat from animals who live good lives under conditions natural for their species, and are then humanely killed on the farm.

It is this sort of thinking that has given impetus to the “happy” meat/animal products movement that is promoted by Singer and virtually all of the large animal organizations in the U.S. and Europe. Using animals is not the problem; the problem is animal suffering. If we decrease suffering through welfare reforms, then we make animal exploitation less morally objectionable. The public can continue to consume animals and feel good about being “compassionate.”

We should not be surprised that more and more people feel comfortable about consuming animal products. After all, they are being assured by the “experts” that suffering is being decreased and they can buy “happy” meat, “free-range” eggs, etc.. These products even come with labels approved of by animal organizations. The animal welfare movement is actually encouraging the “compassionate” consumption of animal products.

Animal welfare reforms do very little to increase the protection given to animal interests because of the economics involved: animals are property. They are things that have no intrinsic or moral value. This means that welfare standards, whether for animals used as foods, in experiments, or for any other purpose, will be low and linked to the level of welfare needed to exploit the animal in an economically efficient way for the particular purpose. Put simply, we generally protect animal interests only to the extent we get an economic benefit from doing so. The concept of “unnecessary” suffering is understood as that level of suffering that will frustrate the particular use. And that can be a great deal of suffering.

But the animal welfare position that that it is the suffering of animals and not their killing per se that raises a moral question begs a very important question: it assumes that because animal minds are different from human minds, animals, unlike humans, do not have the sort of self-awareness that translates into having an interest in continuing to live. The welfare position necessarily assumes that animal life has a lesser moral value than does human life. And welfarists explicitly agree with this, as is clear in my book, The Animal Rights Debate: Abolition or Regulation?

A major focus of my work has been to challenge that welfarist assumption and to argue that the only non-speciesist position to take is that any sentient being–any being who is perceptually aware and has subjective states of awareness–has an interest in continuing to live. Any other view accords an arbitrary preference to human cognition. It is speciesist to maintain that animal life has a a lesser value than human life. This does not necessarily mean that we must treat nonhumans the way we treat humans for all purposes. It does, however, mean that for the purpose of being treated exclusively as a resource for others, all sentient beings are equal and we cannot justify treating any sentient being as a resource.

If animals have an interest in continuing to live, as I maintain they do simply by virtue of being sentient, and if that interest matters morally, which I argue that it must do, then there is only one plausible conclusion: any use–however “humane”–is unjust.

If you are not vegan, please consider going vegan. It’s easy to go vegan; it’s better for your health and for the planet; and, most important, it’s the morally right thing to do.

And please remember: Animal welfare reforms do little, if anything, to reduce animal suffering. But, in any event, the important point is that veganism is not just a matter of reducing suffering; it’s a matter of fundamental moral justice. It is what we owe to those who, like us, value their lives and who want to continue to live.

The World is Vegan! If you want it.

Gary L. Francione
Professor, Rutgers University

©2011 Gary L. Francione

Related posts:

1. “Happy Meat:” Making Humans Feel Better About Eating Animals
2. And You Wonder Why We Suffer from Moral Schizophrenia?

By endorsing welfare reforms that supposedly make exploitation more “compassionate” or single-issue campaigns that falsely suggest that there is a coherent moral distinction between meat and dairy or between fur and wool or between steak and foie gras, we betray the principle of justice that says that all sentient beings are equal for purposes of not being used exclusively as human resources. And, on a practical level, we do nothing more than make people feel better about animal exploitation.

I maintain that those who believe that animals are members of the moral community should, instead, make clear that veganism, defined as not eating, wearing, or using animals, is the non-negotiable, unequivocal moral baseline and should put their labor and resources into grassroots vegan education that may take a myriad of creative forms but should never involve violence.

Those who are critical of my view argue that my position on the need for creative, nonviolent vegan advocacy requires some sort of faith that such an approach will work.

I find that criticism to be ironic in that it would seem that if any position requires faith, defined as a belief that is maintained in the face of all extant empirical evidence, it is that welfare reform and single-issue campaigns will lead anywhere but to more animal exploitation.

Animal Welfare: Why?

Why does anyone believe that welfare reform will lead to abolition? If we look at the history of animal welfare reform, we see that most reforms are minor, most are not even enforced, and most actually increase production efficiency and provide economic benefits to producers. We have had the animal welfare paradigm for 200 years now and we are exploiting more animals now in more horrific ways than at any time in human history.

Why does anyone believe that promoting “happy” exploitation is going to lead to the abolition of exploitation? Use your common sense. “Happy” exploitation won’t lead anywhere but to a public that feels better about particular forms of animal exploitation. If that were not the case, the animal exploitation industries, in partnership with the large animal welfare corporations, would not be investing all the resources that they are investing in “happy” exploitation campaigns and labels.

Why does anyone believe that by continuing to reinforce and strengthen the paradigm that treats animals as property, we will eventually abolish animal exploitation?

Why does anyone believe that single-issue campaigns will lead to the abolition of exploitation? Just take a look at long standing single-issue campaigns, such as the anti-fur campaign. That campaign has been going for decades and the fur industry is stronger than it has ever been. Why? Because there is no principled basis that can serve to distinguish fur from wool or leather, or to distinguish wearing animals from eating them. As long as people do not understand and accept the general moral principle, they will fail to see the problem of specific uses. And it is no answer to say, as many advocates do, that fur represents a gratuitous use of animals. So does eating animals. We eat animals because they taste good. And palate pleasure is no better a justification than is fashion.

As I have written elsewhere, supporters of welfare reform never address these questions; they just declare that any criticism is “divisive” or that any alternative is “too idealistic.” In other words, they have nothing to say.

Veganism as a Moral Baseline: Why Not?

The appeal of creative, nonviolent vegan advocacy is that it challenges people to apply a moral principle that most people already accept and claim to view as important: that it is morally wrong to inflict suffering and death on animals unless it is necessary, and pleasure, amusement, and convenience cannot suffice to demonstrate necessity. When people are confronted with the argument that criticizing Michael Vick for dog fighting does not make sense if we are eating animals or animal products, or with the similarity between the animals whom they love and those they eat or wear, they may not all become vegan immediately, but we have at least gotten them to start thinking about the general issue of animal use in moral terms. And to the extent that the argument resonates–and it will resonate for many–they will begin to assess matters of animal ethics in a different way.

If, as I maintain, we cannot justify the use, however “humane,” of animals, then we ought to be clear about that. We ought to be clear that we cannot justify eating, wearing, or using animals. Period. If those who are concerned about the issue are not yet willing to give up animal use and go vegan, they can take whatever incremental steps they want. But those incremental steps should never be characterized as normatively desirable if we really believe that animal use is unjust. Just as we would never say that “humane” or “happy” sexism or racism is acceptable, we should never characterize “humane” or “happy” meat or dairy or whatever as morally acceptable.

Finally, promoting veganism as a moral baseline is no more a matter of moral “purity” than is promoting justice where humans are concerned. We are told that even if we go vegan, we cannot avoid causing harm to nonhumans. That is true. Living in the world and engaging in any sort of action necessarily has adverse consequences for others, humans and nonhumans alike. We should, of course, endeavor to cause the least amount of harm that we can to all sentient beings. But the fact that we cannot avoid all harm does not mean that we should not at least stop all intentional harm that we inflict on sentient nonhumans just as the fact that we cannot eliminate all violence in the world means that it is morally acceptable for us to murder other humans.

If we are ever to abandon the property paradigm, we need to get people to recognize that animal use, however “humane,” cannot be justified morally. I am confident that creative, nonviolent vegan advocacy is not only consistent with the claim of justice that is entailed, in my view, by the animal rights position, but that it is the best way to achieve the goal of shifting away from the property paradigm and toward the notion of animals as moral persons.

Those grassroots advocates who are engaged in creative, nonviolent vegan education all report that the results are astounding; that people react and react positively.

And I am certain that any belief that welfare reform, single-issue campaigns, “happy” exploitation, etc. will take us anywhere but to a greater level of comfort about animal exploitation requires a particularly blind form of faith.

******

If you are not vegan, please consider going vegan. It’s easy to go vegan; it’s better for your health and for the planet; and, most important, it’s the morally right thing to do.

If you are vegan, educate everyone with whom you come in contact in a creative, nonviolent way about veganism. If we really do regard animals as members of the moral community; if we really believe that we cannot justify unnecessary animal suffering and death, then we cannot justify billions of animal death based on palate pleasure.

And please remember: veganism is not just a matter of reducing suffering; it’s a matter of fundamental moral justice. It is what we owe to those who, like us, value their lives and who want to continue to live.

The World is Vegan! If you want it.

Gary L. Francione
©2011 Gary L. Francione

Related posts:

1. Animal Welfare, Militant Direct Action, Mantras, and Blind Faith
2. Animal Rights, Animal Welfare, and the Slavery Analogy
3. A “Triumph” of Animal Welfare?
4. The Four Problems of Animal Welfare: In a Nutshell
5. Postmodern Feminism and Animal Welfare: Perfect Together

This approach is problematic for a number of reasons:

First, there is absolutely no logical relationship between the possession of humanlike intelligence and the morality of using animals as resources. Possession of humanlike intelligence may indicate that certain animals have interests that other animals may not have. Nonhuman great apes, who do possess humanlike intelligence in many respects, may have interests that dogs or fish do not have. But nonhuman great apes, dogs, and fish all have an interest in not being treated as resources simply by virtue of being sentient, or having subjective awareness. All sentient beings have an interest in not suffering and in continuing to live and these interests are necessarily defeated by their being treated as human resources.

We proclaim human intelligence to be morally valuable per se because we are human. If we were birds, we would proclaim the ability to fly as morally valuable per se. If we were fish, we would proclaim the ability to live underwater as morally valuable per se. But apart from our obviously self-interested proclamations, there is nothing morally valuable per se about human intelligence.

Second, to the extent that we claim that humanlike intelligence is morally relevant, then we are necessarily stuck with the idea that humans with greater intelligence are more morally valuable than humans with less intelligence. It is true; we may not treat all humans alike. We pay a brain surgeon more than a janitor because we value the former’s skill more. But even assuming that differential resource allocation is legitimate, would we say that the janitor is worth less than the surgeon for purposes of deciding who should be used as a forced organ donor or as an unwilling participant in a painful experiment? Of course not. For purposes of being used exclusively as a resource for others, both are equal.

And, unless we want to be speciesist, we must conclude that all sentients–human or nonhuman–are equal for purpose of not being treated as resources.

Third, the “smarts” game is one that nonhuman animals can never win. We have known for decades that nonhuman great apes have humanlike intelligence, which should come as no surprise given the genetic similarity between humans and nonhuman great apes. It is not likely that any other nonhuman animals will ever exhibit a greater degree of humanlike intelligence. And yet, we continue to exploit the nonhuman great apes (and many other nonhuman primates) in all sorts of ways.

The “smarts” game is just that–a game. It is yet another reason not to accord animals moral significance today in favor of more silly (and harmful) research to determine whether animals can solve human math puzzles and perform other tasks that have no moral relevance.

We already know everything we need to know to come to the conclusion that we cannot justify eating, wearing, or using animals–that, like us, animals are sentient. They are subjectively aware. They have interests in not suffering and continuing to live.

Nothing more is needed.

**********

If you are not vegan, please consider going vegan. It’s easy to do so; it’s better for your health and for the planet; and, most important, it’s the morally right thing to do.

If you are vegan, educate everyone with whom you come in contact in a creative, nonviolent way about veganism.

The World is Vegan! If you want it.

Gary L. Francione
©2011 Gary L. Francione

Related posts:

1. A Note on Moral Schizophrenia
2. Moral Behavior and Moral Significance
3. A Note About Michael Vick
4. A Short Note on Abolitionist Veganism as a Single Issue Campaign

The proposed legislation, if passed, will be phased in over the next 18 years and will require:

cages that give hens up to 144 square inches of space each, compared with the 67 square inches that most hens have today. They would also include so-called habitat enrichments, like perches, scratching areas and nesting areas, that allow the birds to express natural behavior.

What will HSUS give as its part of the compromise agreement? HSUS has

agreed to give up on a push to ban cages entirely in exchange for the opportunity to work toward a single, nationwide standard mandating better conditions. The group also said it would shelve efforts to get initiatives onto the ballot in Washington and Oregon, and would agree not to conduct undercover investigations at large egg farms unless it was aware of especially egregious practices.

HSUS calls this “historic”. There will, of course, be a big campaign to get the legislation passed and there will, of course, be all sorts of legal challenges. The “compassion show” will go on for years. The requests for donations “to help the animals” will be endless.

And the best case scenario is that the bill is introduced and passed quickly. What would the hens gain? They would get 124-144 square inches of space in an “enriched” cage, phased in over 18 years, and the “happy” eggs that they produce will have the stamp of approval of HSUS. This situation is analogous to those opposed to water boarding announcing that they had made an agreement to phase in padded water boards over an 18-year period.

There have been two very opposite reactions on the part of animal advocates to this HSUS-UEP agreement.

First, some advocates are criticizing HSUS, claiming that this agreement is a sell-out. They are correct that this is a disaster for animals but, in all fairness, what can one expect from the Humane Society?

HSUS explicitly denies that it endorses animal rights or the abolition of animal exploitation. On the contrary, HSUS supports the Humane Farm Animal Care’s Certified Humane Raised and Handled “happy meat” label and two high-level HSUS executives sit on the board of Humane Farm Animal Care.

Humane Society International (HSI), is an affiliate of HSUS and the CEO of HSI is an HSUS executive. One HSI branch in Australia, which describes itself as “the global arm of HSUS,” sponsors a “happy meat” label for which it charges a fee.

HSUS CEO Wayne Pacelle acknowledges that “the Humane Society is broad-minded when it comes to food. About 95 percent of our members are not vegetarian.” He adds:

But I believe eating is a moral act, and we can make choices to minimize the suffering of (food) animals. We can buy cage-free eggs, buy pork that doesn’t come from factory farms, and avoid eating veal and foie gras.

and

Our program is about responsible hunting and curbing the worst excesses and the most inhumane and unsporting practices.

Sportfishing is not an issue, unless someone did something horrible, like dynamiting fish. Most of the work we’ve done in the marine realm has been protecting marine mammals and seabirds.

Pacelle also states:

Our board of directors is a national volunteer board of directors. Very few of them are vegetarian. I have been since I’ve been a teenager. Whatever I do in my personal life does not necessarily reflect the policies of HSUS and we support certified humane programs, we support other farmers, we work with farmers, we think farming is a noble profession.

I don’t think anyone can reasonably claim that our work is moving in the direction of eliminating animal agriculture as some of the folks in the industry keep repeating.

So joining forces with the egg industry to produce and promote “happy” eggs fits comfortably with what HSUS has been doing for decades. The HSUS-UEP agreement merely confirms-again-that HSUS is all about making deals with industry and making their non-vegetarian members feel that they are engaging in morally acceptable behavior when they buy the “happy” meat and dairy and eggs approved by HSUS.

What HSUS is doing is applying the meaningless concept of “humane” exploitation as it has been applied for the past 200 years. The only difference between HSUS 50 years ago and HSUS now is that HSUS today is promoting its philosophy of “feel good” exploitation to farm animals whereas 50 years ago, they were focused primarily on the animals that we fetishize as a cultural matter: dogs and cats.

The second reaction on the part of animal advocates who claim to be more progressive than HSUS to agree with HSUS that this agreement is some sort of “historic” event; a “landmark” for animals; a “step” toward animal rights.

That is just plain silly. “Enriched” cages involve torturing hens. Period. The torture may be slightly “better,” just as padded water boards may be slightly “better.” But let’s be clear: the hens will continue to be tortured. And they will continue to end up in a slaughterhouse. The only difference is that these tortured eggs will be declared to be “humane” by HSUS. This agreement will be counterproductive in that it will encourage the belief that we can exploit animals in a “kind” or “compassionate” way.

Many animal advocates claim that people are going to continue to eat eggs so we have to do something for animals suffering now. But this agreement, like most of the “happy” exploitation arrangements promoted by HSUS and other organizations, including those who claim to be “animal rights” groups, does not take effect for many years-in this case, 18 years. To the extent that this agreement provides any benefit for animals, it will not occur for many, many years. And even if “enriched cages” provide some welfare benefit, this sort of “reform” makes the public more comfortable about consuming eggs and that guarantees continued consumption.

The problem is that although we should expect nothing more from the “Humane” Society, other organizations that claim to promote animal rights, and ostensibly to endorse the abolition of animal exploitation, also support these sorts of agreements. Virtually all of the large animal groups in the United States and Europe have come out in support of one or more “happy” labels and virtually all are busy making deals with institutional animal users. And supposedly more progressive organizations have already come out in favor of the HSUS-UEP. Indeed, Farm Sanctuary is trying to claim credit, along with HSUS, for the agreement.

The only way that the paradigm of animal exploitation will ever shift is if we educate people to stop demanding animal products based on the recognition that animals are members of the moral community. That goal is not as idealistic as it might appear: most people agree that it is wrong to inflict “unnecessary” suffering or death on animals. They understand that this moral principle excludes suffering or death for reasons of pleasure or convenience or habit. That is why there was such a strongly negative reaction to Michael Vick’s use of dogs for fighting. Vick’s pleasure in watching dogs fight did not justify his infliction of suffering and death on the dogs. The same reasoning applies to our eating animals. There is no difference between sitting around the pit watching dogs fight and sitting around a summer barbecue roasting the corpses of tortured animals or enjoying the dairy or eggs from tortured animals.

We need to educate people that our continued exploitation of animals for food, clothing, entertainment, etc., is unjust; that it is not merely a matter of how we treat animals, but that we use them at all. The reaction to Vick teaches us clearly that people, or at least many people, can understand this idea and accept it. We need to get them to apply it to animals beyond dogs or cats. That can be done through creative, nonviolent education.

The only way that things will ever change is if we build a movement of people who see veganism as a clear moral baseline and where that movement can serve as a catalyst to shift the paradigm away from thinking of nonhumans as commodities for us to use exclusively as means to our ends.

And that will never happen as long as we think that “happy” exploitation is any sort of answer. The belief that “happy” exploitation will result in significant welfare benefits for animals and that this will lead to abolition in the future is simply wrong on both counts.

In conclusion: those who criticize HSUS for making such an agreement should recognize that this sort of thing is exactly what HSUS has been doing forever. It is the “Humane” Society. And “humane” is a meaningless concept in a context in which animals are chattel property. HSUS exists to make people who exploit animals feel better about exploitation. And those who claim that this is a “landmark” agreement for animals and will lead to significant welfare benefits in the near term and reduced use or abolition in the future, should recognize that promoting the notion of “compassionate” exploitation will never-can never-lead to the rejection of animal use. It will only reinforce and perpetuate that use.

Please understand that I in no way question the sincerity of those who support these partnerships with industry or the welfare reforms that are involved. I do, however, believe sincerely that they are wrong.

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If you are not vegan, please consider going vegan. It’s easy to go vegan; it’s better for your health and for the planet; and, most important, it’s the morally right thing to do.

If you are vegan, educate everyone with whom you come in contact in a creative, nonviolent way about veganism. If we really do regard animals as members of the moral community; if we really believe that we cannot justify unnecessary animal suffering and death, then we cannot justify billions of animal death based on palate pleasure.

And please remember: veganism is not just a matter of reducing suffering; it’s a matter of fundamental moral justice. It is what we owe to those who, like us, value their lives and who want to continue to live.

The World is Vegan! If you want it.

Gary L. Francione
©2011 Gary L. Francione

Related posts:

1. The Absurdity of Competing “Humane” Labels: HSUS v. Perdue

Animal Care and Control of New York City, which has operated New York’s municipal animal shelter system since 1995, is an institution plagued with problems. There are shocking allegations of animal abuse and neglect, including a recent report that ACC killed eight puppies who would have been taken and placed by rescue groups.

The behavioral assessment program, which includes taking away food or a toy from a hungry or stressed dog, or seeing how a stressed dog reacts when confronted by another dog, raises significant doubt about whether potential adopters are given anything like an accurate picture about how dogs will behave once they are adopted.

ACC provides a list of dogs and cats who are going to be destroyed between 5:00 p.m. and 6:00 p.m. on the eve of the day that they will be killed. ACC closes at 8:00 p.m. and re-opens in the morning at 8:00 a.m. but it is difficult, if not impossible, to get through on the phone. Killing starts at around 10 a.m. or 11:00 a.m. Rescue groups and adopters are given virtually no time to get animals out of the three shelters operated by ACC. Every night, there is a frantic attempt to save lives and although many animals are saved by rescue groups despite the restrictive and unreasonable policies of ACC, many healthy animals are killed.

A story that appeared on May 16, 2011 provides a troubling insight into the ACC. Emily Tanen was an employee with the ACC program that supposedly acts as a liason between the ACC and rescue groups:

Emily took it upon herself to photograph all of the dogs at the shelter facility – she had a special knack for capturing the inner beauty of her subjects.

Because of her touching, soulful photos, many otherwise “hard to place” or even “unadoptable” dogs were rescued.

But apparently, her beautiful photos of homeless dogs included something that the “powers that be” of the NY Animal Care and Control did not want – photos of dogs receiving human contact.

Her amazing images were often the difference between life and death – for dogs that have no ability to speak on their own behalf, the touching photos were frequently the key to a life-saving rescue….

Images that touched the heart – images that elicited enough feeling from those that viewed them that a life could literally be saved.

But now she is gone from the facility – a powerful advocate for the voiceless animals is no longer there to help.

Drab, dreary, emotionless photos are all that will remain.

I understand that running an animal shelter in a place like New York City is difficult for those with the very best of intentions. But it is becoming increasingly apparent that ACC has a number of policies and practices that appear to be counterproductive at best. And, if even a fraction of the allegations of neglect at ACC are true, then ACC is a hell hole for the animals who are unfortunate enough to find themselves there.

It is never morally justifiable to kill a healthy animal and one healthy animal killed at ACC or any animal shelter is one animal too many. ACC is not only killing hundreds of animals per month, but seems to be in a rush to do so and to do whatever it can to frustrate the efforts of rescue groups and committed people, such as Emily Tanen, to save these animals. Moreover, ACC places a terrible burden on rescue groups, forcing them to engage in a daily frantic rush to save whatever animals they can.

It is high time for there to be better control of New York’s Animal Care and Control. And it is time for New York City shift toward a progressive no-kill shelter situation. This can be achieved if New Yorkers have political will to make it happen.

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If you are not vegan, go vegan. It’s easy; it’s better for your health and for the planet. But, most important, it’s the morally right thing to do. If you are vegan, educate everyone you can about veganism.

And if you can, please adopt or foster a homeless animal. There are so many who need your help. If you do not have the room or resources for a dog or cat or rabbit, there are many smaller animals, such as mice, rats, turtles, and fish, who also need homes. If you have land, there are also many larger animals and farm animals, who need homes.

Caring for individual nonhuman animals is an important part of what animal rights is all about. And if you are involved in animal rescue, remember that there is no difference between the animal you save and the animal you eat.

If you have a companion animal, please make sure that the animal does not reproduce. We do not need any more domesticated animals coming into existence!

The World is Vegan! If you want it.

Gary L. Francione
©2011 Gary L. Francione

Added May 23:

New York Assemblyperson Micah Zellner has proposed legislation that would broaden the ability of rescue groups to get animals out of ACC. Here is a story about Mr. Zellner’s proposal.

Related posts:

1. The New York City Bar Association Sets a Low Bar for Balance
2. The Failure of Anticruelty Laws

In March of 2009, Eric Prescott of the Boston Vegan Association stopped by and spoke with me for about 2 hours. Eric quite skillfully edited the interview to about 20 minutes and he just made it available.

Also featured is my rescued friend, Katie Jane!

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If you are not vegan, go vegan. It’s easy; it’s better for your health and for the planet. But, most important, it’s the morally right thing to do. If you are vegan, educate everyone you can about veganism.

The World is Vegan! If you want it.

Gary L. Francione
©2011 Gary L. Francione

Related posts:

1. Interview on Veganism/Abolition in The Vegan
2. Another Vegan Pamphlet
3. Reminder: BBC World Service Documentary: “Animals and Us”
4. Interview in The Believer
5. Upcoming Interview on WRIR-Indymedia Live